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Insurance
By JOE C. SAVAGE*
INTRODUCTION
The most significant cases in insurance law during the
past survey year concerned uninsured motorist provisions. The
courts considered such questions as whether there must be
physical contact with a "hit-and-run" vehicle; whether unin-
sured motorist coverage may be stacked on the same policy;
whether an insurance company may omit uninsured motorist
coverage for motorcycles and certain other vehicles; how an
insured may prove that another driver is uninsured; and
whether certain exclusions are valid.
Other issues of significance included the unconstitu-
tionality of Kentucky's compulsory medical malpractice insur-
ance act; the question of whether a divorce terminates the
rights of a spouse as a beneficiary in view of Kentucky's no-
fault divorce act; and the relationship between basic reparation
benefits and workmen's compensation payments.
I. UNINSURED MOTORIST CASES
A. "Hit-and-run" Vehicle
On April 22, 1977, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Jett
v. Doe,' upheld the policy requirement that there be some
physical contact between the "hit-and-run" vehicle and the
vehicle in which the insured is riding. This being a case of first
impression, the Court sought the guidance of authority from
other jurisdictions, but found only minimal assistance because
of the unique nature of Kentucky's uninsured motorist statute.2
The Court felt that that statute, although requiring policies to
include uninsured motorist coverage, did not restrict the insur-
* Adjunct Instructor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1961, University of
Oklahoma; J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1965, Harvard University. Part-
ner, Turley, Savage & Moore, Lexington, Kentucky.
551 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1977). In an opinion written prior to Jett, the Court of
Appeals reached the same result on the same grounds. Huelsman v. National Emblem
Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1977).
2 Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.20-020 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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ance company from defining a hit-and-run vehicle as one that
is in physical contact. The Court pointed out that once the
insurance coverage is offered as required by statute, the com-
pany has the right to impose whatever conditions on such cov-
erage it sees fit. Once such a condition is expressed in the
policy, the courts must give it full force and effect.
The Court was careful to point out that the uninsured
motorist statute, unlike comparable statutes in other states,
allows the company to insert restrictions in its policy provisions
defining its terms, through the language "subject to the terms
and conditions of such coverage" contained in the statute.3
The policy of Jett v. Doe' was extended in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mitchell.5 In Mitchell, an
automobile driven by Moran crossed a median and struck the
automobile driven by Mitchell. Moran testified that a utility
truck had pulled into his lane of travel causing him to lose
control of his automobile and cross the median. Thus, there
was physical contact between Mitchell, the insured, and
Moran, but there was not physical contact between Moran and
the unknown utility truck. The Court held that the require-
ment of physical contact had not been met.
B. Stacking
The court of appeals had occasion to consider whether
uninsured motorist coverage could be stacked where the in-
sured had two automobiles insured on the same policy. In Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield' the court allowed such
stacking. Citing Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Siddons7
which had allowed stacking with two automobiles on separate
policies, the court said that there was no reason to distinguish
that situation from the one in which the insured paid separate
premiums for multiple vehicles under one policy. The court
pointed out that the purpose of stacking in the multiple policy
situation is to give effect to the legislative intent that there be
uninsured motorist coverage for each policy. These considera-
3 KRS § 304.20-020(2) (1972).
551 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1977).
553 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1977).
- S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1977).
451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970).
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tions also apply, said the court, to a single policy where multi-
ple coverage is obtained through separate premiums.
C. Validity of Various Exclusions
May the owner of an insured automobile, or his family, be
entitled to uninsured motorist benefits if they are driving a car
owned by them which is not insured? This question was an-
swered in Whitlock v. Redmond8 and Safeco Insurance Co. of
America v. Hubbard.'
Whitlock owned a Ford insured with M.F.A. At the time
of his accident, Whitlock was driving an uninsured Chevrolet
registered in the name of his wife. Whitlock sought the benefits
of the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy with M.F.A.
M.F.A. asserted the exclusion, standard in uninsured motorist
policies, that coverage will not apply "to bodily injury to an
insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other than an in-
sured automobile) owned by the named insured, his spouse, or
a relative, or through being struck by such a highway vehi-
cle." 0
The court held the exclusion void because it violated the
uninsured motorist statute. The court felt that the policy ex-
clusion impermissibly excluded uninsured motorist coverage
when the insured was occupying a vehicle other than the in-
sured automobile which was owned by him, his spouse or a
relative, because the statute contemplated insurance against
an uninsured tortfeasor operating a motor vehicle regardless of
where he finds his victim.
M.F.A. argued that the case should turn on Allen v. West
American Insurance Co.," wherein the Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld a household exclusion with respect to uninsured
motorist coverage despite the statute. The court, however, dis-
tinguished Allen because that case involved the interpretation
of subsection (2) of the uninsured motorist statute which set
out the meaning of the term "uninsured motor vehicle." That
section defined the term uninsured motor vehicle as "subject
- S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1977).
* - S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1978).
- S.W.2d at -.
467 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1971).
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to the terms and conditions of such coverage"' 2 and the court
concluded that the legislature recognized that there would be
certain terms and conditions in a policy with respect to what
constituted an uninsured motor vehicle. Therefore, the house-
hold exclusion was not in violation of the statute.
Similarly, as seen above, the courts have now held that the
definition of a hit-and-run vehicle, which includes only a vehi-
cle making physical contact, is not in violation of the statute.
On the other hand, the court felt that the exclusion removing
uninsured motorist coverage when the insured drives an unin-
sured automobile owned by him, his spouse or relative was in
violation of the statute, because the exclusion did not turn on
the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle and so did not fall
under subsection (2) of the uninsured motorist statute.
Based upon the same policy, that is, that the insurance
company is entitled to define "uninsured highway vehicle"
without violating the uninsured motorist statute, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky upheld an exclusion that a state-owned
truck was not an uninsured vehicle in Commercial Union In-
surance Co. v. Delaney.'3 The Supreme Court also upheld an
exclusion concerning motorcycles in Preferred Risk Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Oliver.'4
D. Uninsured Motorist Benefits and Workmen's
Compensation
In a case that changed the language of the uninsured mo-
torist contract, State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman's
Fund American Insurance Co., '5 the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky settled the clash between uninsured motorist benefits
and workmen's compensation benefits. Under the "limits of
liability" section of a "conditions" clause, the policy provided
that any amount payable as uninsured motorist benefits "shall
be reduced by. . .the amount paid. . . and payable on ac-
count of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation
law ... -,' Referring to this as an offset condition in the pol-
12 KRS § 304.20-020(2) (1972).
13 550 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1977).
11 551 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1977).
550 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1977).
, Id. at 556.
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icy, the Supreme Court declared that the provision was in vio-
lation of the uninsured motorist statute. The statute" requires
minimum coverage limits of $10,000 to $20,000, and the Court
felt that this could not be reduced by any condition in the
policy requiring an offset for workmen's compensation.
Equally important in that case, the Court refused to allow
the workmen's compensation carrier to be subrogated to the
uninsured motorist insurer, upholding an exclusion in the pol-
icy that no benefits may "'inure directly or indirectly to the
benefit of any workmen's compensation carrier or self-insurer
"18 Thus, the employee was able to collect full uninsured
motorist benefits from the employer's automobile insurance
company as well as full workmen's compensation benefits.
E. Proof of Uninsurability
In Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hunt," Hunt was
involved in an automobile accident with Wheet, the alleged
uninsured motorist. When a suit was filed against both Wheet
and Motorists Mutual Insurance Company under the unin-
sured motorist provisions of Hunt's policy, Wheet could not be
served, did not appear and was unavailable for trial. The only
evidence with respect to whether Wheet was uninsured was
found in a conversation between Hunt and Wheet after the
accident, in which Wheet told Hunt that he, Wheet, was unin-
sured. The statement of Wheet obviously was hearsay; the
court nevertheless allowed the testimony as a declaration
against interest. This was so, reasoned the court, because
Wheet, having no insurance, would be making this statement
against his own pecuniary interest in that he would be person-
ally liable for any tortious act.
F. Duty to Cooperate
In Temple v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 20 the Su-
preme Court affirmed a lower court decision in which Temple
lost all of his rights under his uninsured motorist policy be-
,, KRS § 304.20-020 (1972).
Id.
" 549 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. App. 1977).
' 548 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1977).
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cause of his failure to cooperate. In particular, Temple failed
to give sworn statements requested by State Farm, who there-
after claimed that such a breach in the noncooperation clause
was a material and sufficient ground for denial of the coverage.
The Court noted that the basis of Temple's claim against State
Farm under the uninsured motorist features of the policy was
contractual and that the terms and provisions of the policy
required as a condition precedent to any action or right of
recovery that Temple provide sworn statements to State Farm
as often as reasonably required. It is true that Temple notified
State Farm of the accident and provided State Farm an acci-
dent report, but the Court felt that such information was insuf-
ficient for State Farm to evaluate the claim for settlement
purposes. The Court noted that information such as the nature
and extent of the injury and details of the accident itself were
matters within the knowledge of Temple and necessary for
State Farm to have in order to fulfill its responsibility under
the policy.
Temple relied on O'Bryan v. Leibson,21 Wheeler v.
Creekmore,'2 2 and Barry v. Keith,'2 in arguing that he should
not be required to furnish such statements because of a conflict
of interest with State Farm. The Court pointed out, however,
that those three cases dealt with the duty of the insureds to
cooperate where the insurance company was attempting to
control both sides of the litigation in view of the fact that the
uninsured motorist was a party in the case and filing a counter-
claim. In Temple, the uninsured motorist was never served and
was not a party.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In McGuffey v. Hall,24 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional sections 9 and 10 of the compulsory
medical malpractice insurance act passed by the General As-
sembly in 1976.25 Section 9 pertained to discovery of proceed-
2, 446 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1969).
21 469 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1971).
'1 474 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1971).
24 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977).
' 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 163. Section 9 amended KRS § 311.377 and § 10 was included
along with other provisions in KRS Chapter 304.
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ings and records of various peer review organizations and to
limits of liability of its members, all of which the Court felt
were not germane to the purpose of the entire act and therefore
in violation of section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution.26 Sec-
tion 10 consisted of nine subsections, which generally required
every physician to carry $100,000 to $300,000 malpractice in-
surance, created a Patients' Compensation Fund into which all
physicians had to pay, and provided that judgments in excess
of the physician's base coverage would be paid out of the fund,
if not exhausted; if the fund was exhausted, judgments would
be paid out of the general funds of the Commonwealth on a
loan basis. The justification for the Act was the alleged medical
malpractice insurance crisis.
The Court first held that by attempting to underwrite the
Fund through recourse to the Commonwealth's general fund,
section 10 created a future debt in violation of section 5027 of
the Kentucky Constitution and loaned credit of the Common-
wealth in violation of section 17728 of the Constitution. Next,
the Court held that the provision for compulsory malpractice
insurance was not justified as an exercise of the police power
and was therefore in violation of sections 129 and 230 of the
26 Ky. CONST. § 51 provides:
No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, and no law shall be revised,
amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its
title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended or conferred,
shall be re-enacted and published at length.
1 Ky. CONST. § 50 provides:
No act of the General Assembly shall authorize any debt to be contracted on
behalf of the Commonwealth except for the purposes mentioned in section 49, unless
provision be made therein to levy and collect an annual tax sufficient to pay the
interest stipulated, and to discharge the debt within thirty years; nor shall such act
take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people at a general election, and
shall have received a majority of all votes cast for and against it: Provided, The General
Assembly may contract debts by borrowing money to pay any part of the debt of the
state, without submission to the people, and without making provision in the act
authorizing the same for a tax to discharge the debt so contracted, or the interest
thereon.
" KY CONST. § 177 provides: "The credit of the Commonwealth shall not be given,
pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or association, municipal-
ity, or political subdivision of the state ....
2' KY. CONST. § 1 provides: "All men are, by nature free and equal, and have
certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: .. .Fifth: The
right of acquiring and protecting property."
KY. CONST. § 2 provides: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty
1978]
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Kentucky Constitution, since there was no showing that com-
pulsory insurance helps solve any shortage of available insur-
ance.
III. INSURANCE AND DIVORCE
In Denton v. The Travelers Insurance Co., 31 the court of
appeals had occasion to reconsider Bissell v. Gentry.2 In Bissell
the court had held that a divorce extinguished the rights of the
spouse as a beneficiary under a life insurance policy. The ra-
tionale behind Bissell was Kentucky's restoration statute,
33
which, of course, was changed by the no-fault divorce act.34 In
Denton, however the court continued the same reasoning with
respect to Bissell because it found that the no-fault divorce act
did not substantially change the restoration provisions in this
context. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of
appeals, holding that the new divorce provisions do not extin-
quish the rights of the spouse as beneficiary. The Supreme
Court did not overrule Bissell, however, so divorces under the
old law may still extinguish such rights.
IV. NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
The case upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky's no-
fault legislation came down in 1975;11 the only other case to be
decided on the no-fault act is Smith v. United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co." This case deals with the problem of deduct-
ing workmen's compensation benefits before the insurance car-
rier pays basic reparation or no-fault benefits.
Peggy Smith's husband was employed by the Jefferson
County Police Department and was killed in an automobile
accident while on duty. She was paid benefits in the amount
of $96.00 per week by the workmen's compensation carrier from
the time of her husband's death until a settlement was reached
with the third party tortfeasor. As a part of her settlement,
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."
555 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. App. 1977).
32 403 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1963).
KRS § 403.065 (1972)(repealed).
KRS §§ 403.610-403.350 (Supp. 1976).
Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975).
- S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1978).
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Mrs. Smith agreed to subject $16,200 of her settlement to the
workmen's compensation carrier's subrogation rights at the
rate of $96.00 per week until exhausted.
Mrs. Smith also made a claim against U.S.F. & G. for
basic reparation benefits. In reply U.S.F. & G. cited KRS §
304.39-120(1), which provides that "all benefits or advantages
a person received or is entitled to receive because of the injury
from Social Security and Workmen's Compensation are sub-
tracted in computing net loss," and argued that because Mrs.
Smith had received workmen's compensation benefits in excess
of the $10,000 no-fault obligation, U.S.F. & G. did not have to
pay anything. The court did not agree.
Sections -210(3) and -120(1)" 7 are the two sections explic-
itly providing the exclusive means by which the reparation
obligor (U.S.F. & G. in this case) may receive credit for work-
men's compensation. Under section -210(3), reparation bene-
fits are payable on a monthly basis as they accrue, not as a
lump sum. If workmen's compensation benefits have not yet
been paid to the claimant, the reparation obligor must pay the
claim without deduction for those benefits. If workmen's com-
pensation benefits have been paid, the reparation obligor com-
putes its liability in one of the following ways. First, the repara-
tion obligor may subtract those payments actually made from
the insured's total loss in computing net loss under section -
120(1). Alternatively, the reparation obligor may demand reim-
bursement from the claimant or the party obligated to make
the payments under section -210(3) to the extent that the total
recovery exceeds the claimant's actual loss. However, the in-
surer may not do both.
Thus, reasoned the court, the lower court's error was in not
calculating Mrs. Smith's gross loss. If the gross loss exceeds any
recovery from collateral sources, the insured is entitled to re-
cover from the reparation obligor such amount as will fully
compensate him for the loss, up to the maximum amount avail-
able under the policy. If the gross loss does not exceed the
recovery from collateral sources, the insured is not entitled to
recover from the reparation obligor.
The court used as an example the fact that the workmen's
KRS §§ 304.39-210(3), -120(1)(Supp. 1976).
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compensation carrier paid $1,500 for burial expenses. The per-
tinent statute38 provides a maximum of $1,000 for funeral and
burial expenses under the no-fault benefits. This does not
mean that because $1,500 had already been paid by workmen's
compensation, the no-fault carrier has no further responsibil-
ity. If the actual expense to the insured of the funeral exceeds
the benefits he had received from this workmen's compensa-
tion, then the reparation obligor is liable for that expense up
to the limits of the policy.
I KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Supp. 1976).
